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I. INTRODUCTION
By many yardsticks, public choice is the single most successful
transplant from the world of economics to legal scholarship., As with
other law-and-economics scholarship, critics have attacked its as-
sumptions, its methodology, and its conclusions. But nearly everyone
concedes the power of at least some of the insights of public choice,
and many of its terms, including "public choice" itself, have become
common coinage in the legal literature, even among those who would
never overtly rely on law-and-economics perspectives in their work.
Although both Maxwell Stearns's collection of readings and
commentary, Public Choice and Public Law,2 and much of this Review
focus principally on public choice in the legal literature, it is useful to
begin with a brief description of the emergence of public choice
outside of law. The antecedents of public choice date back over two
centuries,3 but the modern public choice literature is usually traced to
pathbreaking work by Duncan Black in 1948 and Kenneth Arrow in
1951. 4 Black's work, together with that of several other theorists,"
suggested that interest groups will exercise disproportionate influence
over the political process. Arrow's work on collective decisionmaking
underscored the difficulty of ensuring both fairness and rationality in
legislative decisionmaking.6
1. As will become clear in my more detailed description of public choice in Part H, public
choice actually came from the political science literature as well as from economics. Most public
choice scholarship uses economic perspectives to explore the traditional concerns of political
science.
2. Maxwell L. Stearns, Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary
(Anderson, 1997) ('PCPL").
3. As Professor Stearns notes in his preface, interest group theory can be traced back to
David Hume's theory of factions, and the French mathematician The Marquis de Condorcet
wrestled in the late eighteenth century with some of the problems of collective decisionmaking
described below. Id. at xxi.
4. Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. Pol. Econ. 23 (1948)
(explaining how groups make decisions when members are not in complete accord); Kenneth J.
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (John Wiley & Sons, 1951). See notes 20-23 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Arrow's Theorem.
5. Other foundational contributions include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy (Harper & Row, 1957) (arguing that rational voters have little incentive to inform
themselves); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (U. of Michigan,
1962) (exploring the rules governing legislative decisionmaking based on the assumption that
decisionmakers act in their own self interest); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action
(Harvard U., 1971) (exploring the dynamics of collective action and concluding that small groups
are more likely to be effective than large ones).
6. The two aspects of public choice scholarship that I have just described correspond to
the two principal branches of public choice, interest group theory and social choice, each of
which will be discussed in some detail in Part II. Although I have emphasized the influence of
Black's article on the development of interest group theory in the text, it also influenced Arrow's
work and is seen as seminal both to interest group theory and to social choice. Black also dealt
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Public choice emerged at a time when, although recognizing
the influence of interest groups, many leading political theorists as-
sumed that pluralism-often defined as vigorous competition among a
variety of interests-would lead to legislation that generally furthered
the public good.7 If nothing else, public choice cast cold water on this
perspective and offered a much more sober view of the political
process.
Legal scholars first began to explore these insights in earnest
in the mid-1970s. Much of the early legal literature debated the im-
plications of public choice for judicial review. Could, or should, courts
attempt to correct for the dysfunctions of the legislative process, and
if so, how?8 Subsequent commentators pointed out that judicial deci-
sionmaking and market processes may also be subject to interest
group pressures and the concerns raised by social choice. These schol-
ars argued that a more complete analysis must realistically consider
the nature of each of the relevant institutions.
Public Choice and Public Law is the fourth book, all of which
have appeared in the last six years, to explore the implications of
public choice for legal issues at a general level s The first, Law and
Public Choice by Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey,10 can be seen as
both a general introduction to public choice and an argument that its
insights support traditional theories of statutory interpretation.
William Eskridge's Dynamic Statutory Interpretation" also focuses on
more directly with social choice concerns in subsequent work. See generally Duncan Black, The
Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge U., 1958). For useful overviews and histories of
public choice and its two branches, see Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in John Eatwell, Murray
Millgate, and Peter Newman, eds., 3 The New Palgrave A Dictionary of Economics 1040
(Stockton Press, 1987) (discussing interest group theory and social choice, with emphasis on
interest group theory); Charles K. Rowley, Introduction, in Charles K. Rowley, ed., 1 Public
Choice Theory: Homo Economicus in the Political Market Place ix (Edward Elgar, 1993)
(focusing on interest group theory); Charles K. Rowley, Introduction, in Charles K. Rowley, ed.,
1 Social Choice Theory: The Aggregation of Preferences xi-xvi (Ashgate, 1993) (discussing social
choice).
7. Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Cornell U., 1952); David B. Truman, The
Governmental Process (Knopf, 2d. ed. 1971).
8. I discuss these developments in detail in Part III.
9. Other books that are motivated in significant part by the insights of public choice, but
which focus on particular areas of the law include, Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners
(Princeton U., 1994) (developing a political theory of separation of ownership and control in cor-
porate governance); William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics
(Harvard U., 1995) (presenting an interest group analysis of takings).
10. Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction (U. of Chicago, 1991).
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Harvard U., 1994).
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statutory interpretation, and uses public choice to argue that judges
should be solicitous of underrepresented groups.
While the first two books reflect what might be described as
the first wave of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship, the third,
Imperfect Alternatives by Neil Komesar, can be seen as inaugurating a
new trend. 12 Komesar emphasizes the importance of comparative
institutional analysis, and criticizes the "single institutional" focus of
most existing law-and-economics analysis.
Professor Stearns's Public Choice and Public Law differs most
obviously from the three books I have just mentioned in that it is a
collection of readings, rather than a through-written book. Yet it
would be misleading to characterize Stearns's effort as simply a sur-
vey of the first two decades of public-choice-influenced legal scholar-
ship. It is that, to be sure, but Public Choice and Public Law also
offers extensive commentary that both reflects and extends the dis-
tinctive, and important, perspective that Stearns has brought to his
own work in this area. 3
I describe Public Choice and Public Law in some detail in Part
IV of this Review. I begin, however, with the basic (and for many,
quite perplexing) question: What exactly is "public choice?"'14 After
describing the interest group and social choice branches of the public
choice literature, and explaining the relevance of collective action
theory, game theory, and positive political theory, I focus in Part III
on public-choice-influenced legal scholarship. In addition to
elaborating on the brief account given above, Part III considers how
legal scholars can, and in my view should, make use of public choice
insights in their current and future work. I emphasize two
approaches that strike me as particularly promising, which I refer to
as "institution reinforcing" scholarship and "framing" strategies. In
Part IV, I return to Stearns's book and show how it both provides a
valuable resource for existing public choice scholarship and advances
the next wave of public-choice-influenced legal analysis.
12. Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics,
and Public Policy (U. of Chicago, 1994).
13. A caveat at the outset. I have known Max Stearns for some time, and have read much
of his work (including parts of Public Choice and Public Law) in draft, so in some respects I am
not an entirely objective reviewer. I have no doubt that I would be equally enthusiastic about
his work if I did not know him, however, and I do not hesitate to point out my occasional
quibbles with Public Choice and Public Law in the analysis that follows.
14. Stearns gives a useful overview of the development of public choice and introduces
some of the terminology I discuss in Part II. PCPL at xvii-xxvi (cited in note 2). My aim in Part
II is to provide a more detailed exposition of the terms and the relationships among them.
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II. WHAT IS PUBLIC CHOICE?
A. The Two Branches of Public Choice
When a new perspective comes into vogue, it is perhaps inevit-
able that commentators will employ it in confusingly different, and
even inconsistent, ways. This certainly has been true of public choice.
The term "public choice" is bandied about so loosely that it can seem
extraordinarily unclear just what this analysis is. Is public choice the
same thing as "social choice," for instance, or are they somehow differ-
ent? How does game theory relate to this analysis, and how do con-
cerns about "collective choice" or "positive political theory" fit in?
The discussion that follows offers brief answers to some of
these questions. Most importantly, I will define what most
commentators mean by "public choice." I then will consider the
relationship between public choice and other perspectives that often
appear in public-choice-influenced scholarship.
At a general level, the distinctive characteristic of public choice
is its "use of economic tools to deal with the traditional problems of
political science."' Perhaps the most basic of these tools is the as-
sumption of individual rationality. In contrast to much traditional
political analysis, public choice assumes that all of the relevant play-
ers tend to act in their own self-interest, and explores the implications
of self-interest for the legislative and other institutional decisionmak-
ing processes.
The public choice literature thus can, and in my view should,
be seen as including any analysis that incorporates or explicitly
challenges the self-interestedness premise in addressing institutional
decisionmaking processes. The literature that fits within this defini-
tion consists of two principal branches. The first can be described as
interest group analysis, and the second is social choice.
The central insight of interest group analysis is that concen-
trated interest groups often benefit at the expense of more widely
scattered groups, even if the diffuse group has much more at stake
overall.16 Although this insight is now so familiar that it seems obvi-
15. Tullock, Public Choice, in Eatwell, Millgate, and Newman, eds., 3 The New Palgrave at
1040 (cited in note 6).
16. For cites to foundational works in interest group theory, see notes 4-5. Subsequent
explorations of the relative effectiveness of concentrated groups, as compared to more diffuse
ones, include George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci.
1997]
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ous to many, it was far from obvious when it emerged in the public
choice literature. Whereas many theorists assumed that interest
group competition tends to produce public-regarding legislation,
public choice suggested that self-interested behavior by each of the
relevant actors could lead to strikingly different outcomes.
The reasoning is as follows. For a self-interested voter, taking
the time to inform herself and to vote intelligently is an unattractive
proposition, since the likelihood that her vote will affect the outcome
of an election is minuscule. Although voters as a group would benefit
if each took the time to vote intelligently, ordinary voters simply do
not have an incentive to do so. By contrast, because the members of a
concentrated interest group have more at stake with respect to the
issues that concern them, they tend both to inform themselves and to
participate actively in the political process. 17
The interest group branch of public choice suggests that the
distinction between ordinary voters and concentrated interest groups
is not lost on legislators. Self-interested legislators are likely to focus
principally on getting reelected, since legislators who fail to do so
quickly become ex-legislators. Because interest groups are better
informed than ordinary voters, and serve as an important source of
political funding, legislators have a tremendous incentive to be re-
sponsive to interest group perspectives. 18
3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & Econ. 211
(1976); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 Q. J. Econ. 371 (1983) (arguing that competition between interest groups increases spending
on the public good). James Q. Wilson and Michael Hayes developed systematic accounts of
Congress based on these distinctions. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Basic Books,
1973); Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislatures: A Theory of Political Markets (Rutgers U.,
1981).
17. Those familiar with the literature will recognize this aspect of interest group analysis
as based on collective action theory. I describe collective action theory and its relationship with
public choice below with a particular emphasis on the contributions of Mancur Olson. See notes
33-36. Although I treat collective action theory separately for expositional clarity, I should note
that it is very much a part of the interest group literature.
One of the enduring puzzles of the literature is why, given the lack of incentive to vote, a
relatively large number of citizens do in fact vote. Commentators critical of public choice point
to this puzzle as evidence of the limitations of its rationality and self-interestedness
assumptions. Compare generally Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987) (describing the literature on voting patterns and
criticizing public choice theorists' explanations), with Michael E. DeBow and Dwight R. Lee,
Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66
Tex. L. Rev. 993 (1988) (defending public choice analysis).
18. See, for example, R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (Yale U.,
1990). For a critique of this reasoning, arguing that legislators are motivated by factors such as
ideology and advancement within Congress, rather than reelection alone, see Kay Lehman
Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy (Harper & Row,
1986).
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Like the interest group literature itself, I have focused princi-
pally on the advantages interest groups have in the legislative proc-
ess. But this analysis, and in particular its self-interest assumption,
also has generated important insights into related areas such as the
incentives of agency bureaucrats and, as we shall see in Part III, the
nature of the judicial process. 19
The second branch of public choice is social choice. At the
heart of much of the recent social choice literature is Kenneth Arrow's
famous impossibility theorem. Arrow's Theorem demonstrates that it
is impossible to design a system that will always both aggregate the
preferences of a group of decisionmakers in a rational fashion, and
satisfy a short list of fairness requirements. 20 If there is a particular
kind of inconsistency, referred to as multipeakedness, across the
preferences of a group of decisionmakers (each of whose individual
preferences is wholly consistent), the voting procedure will cycle
endlessly among the possible outcomes unless one or more of the
fairness requirements is relaxed.2 1
To see this, assume that Voter 1 prefers outcome A to B, and B
to C; Voter 2's preferences are B, C, A; and Voter 3's ranking is C, A,
19. On agency bureaucrats, see William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative
Government 36-42 (Aldine-Atherton, 1971) (arguing that bureaucrats seek to maximize their
agency's budget). On judges, see Richard A. Posner, What do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 28-30 (1993) (analogizing judicial
decisionmaking to adhering to the rules of a game). Public choice theorists have had far more
difficulty modeling bureaucrats' and judges' behavior, as compared to legislators and private
economic actors, due to the absence of a compelling theory as to what bureaucrats and judges
maximize. Public choice insights have also been applied to the market process. See, for
example, Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 98-122 (cited in note 12).
20. See generally Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (cited in note 4). For
important explorations of Arrow's Theorem and of the overall insights of social choice, see
William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, 74 Q. J. Econ. 507, 508-12 (1960)
(developing list of fairness requirements from Arrow's analysis); William H. Riker, Liberalism
Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social
Choice (W.H. Freeman, 1982) (social choice analysis of the effects of voting rules and difficulties
in aggregating preferences); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge U., 1989) (leading
text and survey of interest group theory and social choice).
21. Briefly, the fairness terms are "unlimited range," which requires that no individual
preference ordering be held off-limits; "independence of irrelevant alternatives," which requires
that each decisionmaker adhere to her actual ordinal ranking of the alternatives (rather than
voting strategically); "nondictatorship," which precludes any one individual's preferences from
trumping those of others; "universality," which requires that no possible preference ordering be
precluded; and "unanimity," or the "Pareto postulate," which requires that the process honor
any preference held by all of the decisionmakers. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm
in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming February 1997) (manuscript at 22 n.45,
on file with the Author) (citing Vickrey, 74 Q. J. Econ. at 507 (cited in note 20)). See also
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L. J. 1219, 1247-52
(1994) (describing the criteria of Arrow's Theorem in detail).
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B. In a pairwise vote between A and B, outcome A would prevail
(with Voter 1 and Voter 3 voting for A). Outcome C would prevail
over A in a similar vote (on the strength of votes from Voter 2 and
Voter 3). But, in a third vote between C and B, B would prevail,
despite the fact that it loses to outcome A, which C defeats. On closer
consideration, it quickly becomes clear that none of the three options
can defeat the other two in pairwise voting, and that any voting
outcome is thus unstable. This cycling occurs because the preferences
are "multipeaked." Preferences are multipeaked only if the
decisionmakers not only disagree about which choice is best (or
second best or worst), but also disagree about the relationship among
the choices. If their preferences were arrayed from smallest to
largest, or conservative to liberal, the problem would disappear.
Cycling would not occur even if the decisionmakers each chose a
different first choice. 22
Much of the recent literature has focused on the trade-off
posed by the possibility of multipeaked preferences. A voting
institution that adheres to Arrow's fairness criteria will cycle
endlessly in these circumstances, but relaxing one or more of the
requirements introduces the possibility of path dependence and path
manipulation. To give a familiar example, Congress's prohibition
against reconsidering an outcome that has been defeated in an earlier
vote counteracts the risk of cycling. In the illustration above, for
instance, outcome C would prevail under this rule, since outcome B
could not be reintroduced after it lost to outcome A. Yet the cost of
eliminating cycling is that the order of voting determines the
outcome-the result is path dependent. The rule, therefore, vests
significant power in anyone who has the ability to manipulate the
order of the voting.2 3
The discussion thus far suggests a rough rule of thumb for
distinguishing between the interest group and social choice branches
of public choice. Many of the important contributions of interest
group theory stem from the insight that not all voters are equal due to
22. To see this, assume in the illustration above that A is a conservative position, B is
moderate, and C liberal. If this were true, voters 1 and 2, as a conservative and a moderate,
might keep the preference orderings described earlier (Voter 1 = A, B, C; Voter 2 = B, C, A).
Voter 3, as a liberal, would probably change her ordering to C, B, A, since her second choice,
after the liberal outcome, would no doubt be the moderate one. If we make this single shift in
the voters' preferences, the cycling problem disappears. Option B now defeats both A and C in
pairwise votes (voters 2 and 3 prefer B over A, and voters 1 and 2 prefer B over C).
23. For an excellent discussion of path dependence and agenda control, and the effect that
factors such as congressional committee structures have, see Riker, Liberalism Against
Populism at 137-95 (cited in note 20).
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the organizational advantages enjoyed by members of a concentrated
group. Social choice, on the other hand, explores the dynamics of
voting under conditions where voters are at least initially assumed to
have an equal voice. In fact, the literature on cycling shows that vot-
ing pathologies can emerge even if each voter participates fully.2 4
Despite this distinction, it is important to emphasize that the
line between interest group theory and social choice is a rough one,
and it quickly blurs in both directions.25 The two branches of public
choice analysis share a common history, and commentators often
employ both in their efforts to understand a particular voting institu-
tion. Consider the extensive literature on logrolling. From a social
choice perspective, logrolling may act as a solution to cycling concerns,
since legislators avoid cycling by trading votes on matters they are
relatively indifferent about for votes on matters about which they care
deeply. Interest group theory raises questions as to whether the
"solution" is an attractive one, however, given that logrolling could en-
hance interest groups' ability to obtain private benefits from the legis-
lative process. 26
An additional source of confusion is that the term public choice
is used in two ways. I have characterized public choice as a general
term comprising both interest group theory and social choice, and
many commentators do likewise.27  But other commentators use
public choice more narrowly, as a synonym for interest group
analysis. 28 When a commentator indicates that she will tell a "public
24. In addition to cycling, arguably the most prominent other social choice insight is the
Median Voter Theorem. The Median Voter Theorem suggests that the candidates in two party
(or two issue) voting contests will edge toward the middle in an effort to capture a majority of
votes. In consequence, the position of the median voter will prove pivotal. This is precisely the
effect that our changes to the cycling illustration produced in note 22. The theorem has given
rise to a vast literature exploring the insight and the conditions under which it does or does not
hold. For an overview, see Mueller, Public Choice II at 65-74, 180-82 (cited in note 20).
25. Other commentators have suggested that interest group theory is descriptive rather
than normative in nature, whereas social choice is inherently normative-focusing on how
voting procedures should function. See, for example, Rowley, Introduction, in Rowley, 1 Public
Choice Theory at ix (cited in note 6). Although there is an initial plausibility to this distinction,
it quickly breaks down. Interest group theory is increasingly normative in nature, as Buchanan
and Tullock's work on constitutions demonstrates. For an early example, see Buchanan and
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (cited in note 5). Further, much social choice work is
descriptive. See, for example, Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1219 (cited in note 21).
26. For a useful discussion of logrolling, and its potential for either perverse or benign
effects, see Mueller, Public Choice II at 82-94 (cited in note 20).
27. Mueller's excellent book on public choice theory is an example. Id. at 1-6 (describing
the coverage of the book, which includes both social choice and interest group theory).
28. Although Professor Stearns appears to define public choice in the preface as
comprising both social choice and interest group theory, see, for example, PCPL at xix (cited in
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choice story" about a given issue, it is often this narrower definition
that she has in mind.
B. Related Concepts
Having explored in some detail what we mean when we talk
about public choice, we still must consider how several related modes
of analysis interact with public choice. Two of the most important are
game theory and collective action theory. I will focus on these, then
conclude with a brief description of the emerging literature employing
"positive political theory."
Game theory refers to the economic analysis of strategic inter-
action-the choices that individuals make when they recognize the
outcome depends in part on the decisions made by others.29 The
"game" in game theory, then, is the interaction between two or more
independent decisionmakers, each of whom attempts to account for
the actions of the others. Game theoretic analysis formalizes this
interaction by precisely specifying the players involved, the informa-
tion available to each at any given point, and the different outcomes
that would result from each set of "moves" the players might make.30
The most familiar game theory insight is the prisoners' di-
lemma. In the prisoners' dilemma, two prisoners who have
committed a crime and cannot communicate with one another must
each decide whether to confess. Although the prisoners would be
better off if neither confessed than if both confessed, the best outcome
results from confessing when the other prisoner refuses to do so. As a
result, both have an incentive to confess and the game often results in
the least desireable outcome--two confessions. 31
note 2), he treats public choice and social choice as distinct perspectives-thus equating public
choice with interest group theory-elsewhere in the book. See, for example, id. at 556
(distinguishing "teachings of public choice" and "teachings of social choice").
29. Stephen W. Salant and Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime
Time?, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1839, 1846-47 (1996).
30. For those interested in exploring game theory further, two excellent book reviews and
the books they discuss are a good starting point. See id. (reviewing Douglas G. Baird, Robert H.
Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard U., 1994)); Ian Ayres,
Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1291 (1990) (reviewing first edition of Eric
Rasmusen, Games and Information (Basil Blackwell, 1989)). See also Robert J. Aumann, Game
Theory, in John Eatwell, Murray Millgate, and Peter Newman, eds., 2 The New Palgrave. A
Dictionary of Economics 460 (Stockton Press, 1987) (providing a history of game theory).
Another useful introduction is David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modeling
(Clarendon Press, 1990).
31. The literature on the prisoners' dilemma is legion. For an overview, see Anatol
Rapaport, Prisoner's Dilemna, in John Eatwell, Murray Millgate, and Peter Newman, eds., 3
The New Palgrave" A Dictionary of Economics 973 (Stockton Press, 1987). Professor Stearns
also provides a useful discussion in PCPL at 119 (cited in note 2).
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The irony of the prisoners' dilemma-that the actions of indi-
viduals behaving in their own best interests can produce outcomes
that are undesirable for all of them-has led to valuable insights in a
wide range of areas. One of the most important is in public choice.
Recall the interest group insight that diffuse groups tend to fare
poorly in the legislative process. The principal reason for this is that,
while the members of a diffuse group might be better off if each
participated in an informed fashion, each member has little incentive
to do so. In other words, diffuse groups tend to face a debilitating
prisoners' dilemma problem. Interest group analysis thus depends in
important respects on a concept taken straight from game theory.
In contrast, the central insight in social choice theory, Arrow's
Theorem, does not involve game theory in its initial formulation. The
principled voting requirement precludes voters from considering the
preferences and likely actions of other voters, thus ruling game theo-
retic interactions out of bounds.3 2 Yet once we move beyond the initial
formulation-as we must, given that no institution can both satisfy
the fairness requirements and guarantee rational outcomes-strategic
interaction quickly reenters the picture. The agenda control and
strategic voting concerns that have animated much of the social choice
literature are classic examples of strategic interaction, and are par-
ticularly amenable to game theoretic analysis.
As should be clear by now, game theory is a useful tool in any
context where we wish to consider the nature of strategic interaction
between two or more decisionmakers. Because strategic interaction is
integral to much of public choice, it is not surprising that we find so
much game theoretic analysis in the public choice literature. The
second term we need to fit into our picture is collective action-not to
be confused with the misleadingly similar term "collective choice."33
As with game theory, we can see the relevance of collective action
theory most easily by focusing on the interest group branch of public
choice. Recall that the prisoners' dilemma from game theory is a
32. This criterion, which is usually characterized as the "independence of irrelevant alter-
natives," requires that the voters consider only their preferences with respect to a given vote,
without taking other possible votes into account. See note 21 for a list of other relevant criteria.
33. "Collective choice" is a term some commentators use to characterize the literature I
refer to as social choice. See, for example, Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice:
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 6-9
(1991) (providing that collective choice theory assumes that each individual has an equal vote).
Collective choice can thus be seen as a synonym for social choice. I have used social choice
because most commentators do likewise, and because it seems at least marginally less
confusing.
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useful tool for explaining the barriers that often prevent large groups
from acting in concert.34 The collective action literature starts from
precisely the same insight, that free riding prevents many groups
from acting collectively. 35
Collective action theorists take the obstacles to collective
action as their starting point, and ask how it is that some groups do
succeed in acting collectively. These theorists have identified two
factors that seem particularly important to successful group action.
First, smaller groups have a significant advantage as compared to
large ones, both because members may have a larger individual stake
in successful action and because members can more easily police one
another against free riding. Second, groups that have access to
"selective incentives"-that is, mechanisms for rewarding or
punishing members for contributing or failing to contribute to the
collective action-are more likely to prove effective.36
A moment's reflection will make clear that collective action
analysis is central to the distinction between concentrated and diffuse
groups in interest group analysis, and to any effort to predict which
groups will prove successful in legislative and other decisionmiaking
processes. The collective action literature is less immediately
relevant to social choice, since social choice tends to focus on the
voting decisions made by isolated individuals within a decisionmaking
process. Yet as soon as we move beyond stylized assumptions about
the voting process, and integrate interest group questions such as
why some voters vote and others don't into our social choice analysis,
collective action concerns come back into play.
In attempting to relate game theory and collective action to
public choice, it is tempting to suggest that the former apply broadly
to aspects of legislative, market, and judicial behavior, whereas public
34. See note 31 and accompanying text.
35. Collective action theory thus depends in its very conception on a game theoretic
insight.
36. See Mancur Olson, Collective Action, in John Eatwell, Murray Millgate, and Peter
Newman, eds., 1 The New Palgrave" A Dictionary of Economics, 474, 474-75 (Stockton Press,
1987). Olson's book The Logic of Collective Action (cited in note 5), was the pioneering work,
and Olson has been the guiding light of the discipline. The other most prominent theorist is
Russell Hardin. See Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Johns Hopkins U., 1982). Hardin
emphasizes that it is the concentration of members in a group, rather than their number that
determines the group's ability to organize. Id. at 40-41. He also contends that successful
collective action often results from political entrepreneurship, or as a by-product of other
activity by a group. Id. at 35-37 (discussing political entrepreneurship); id. at 31-35 (discussing
by-product).
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choice is uniquely concerned with the legislative process. 37 Yet this
would be a mistake. Although public choice has focused primarily on
legislative behavior, it increasingly has been employed to explore
courts and markets as well, as I will consider in much more detail in
Part III.
Before we turn to the applications of public choice, however,
we should briefly consider one final term: positive political theory.
Positive political theory uses game theory to explore relationships
among decisionmaking institutions such as Congress, administrative
agencies, and the courts. It differs from public choice in that it
focuses on the strategic interactions among political decisionmaking
institutions, and on institutional structures, rather than on the
individuals who comprise the institutions. Positive political theory
does take account of the problems of multi-individual decisionmaking
that preoccupy collective action theory and the two branches of public
choice. But it does so indirectly. Positive political theory incorporates
these considerations into its characterization of an institution. It
then takes intra-institution concerns as a given, in a sense, in order to
emphasizes strategic interactions between and among institutions.
In short, this new perspective makes direct use of game
theoretic analysis; though it has a different focus than either branch
of public choice, it is closely connected to both.38
III. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE LEGAL LITERATURE
As is usually the case when legal academics draw on nonlegal
insights, public choice did not enter legal discourse until well after it
had captured the attention of economists and political scientists. It
was not until the mid-1970s that legal scholars first explored the
implications of public choice, even though many of the seminal in-
sights of both interest group theory and social choice had been in
place for over a decade. Since then, public choice has taken the legal
37. Notice that this distinction is to a certain extent implied by the frequent description of
public choice-the description with which I began the analysis of this Part-as the use of eco-
nomic approaches to explore the concerns of political science.
38. Important contributions to this emerging literature include William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331 (1991)
(describing interaction between Congress, courts, and the President); John A. Ferejohn and
Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 Intl Rev. L. & Econ. 263
(1992) (analyzing interaction between the Supreme Court, the Congress enacting legislation,
and the current Congress in the context of Court decisions based on statutes).
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literature by storm. In this Part, I will briefly describe the diffusion
of public choice into the legal literature. I then will speculate as to
the future of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship.
A. Law and Public Choice: The First Wave
The first wave of public choice inquiry in the legal literature
can be seen as a classic illustration of legal academics sticking to their
area of comparative advantage. Whereas much of the extant eco-
nomic and political science public choice literature focused on the
legislative process, legal academics asked what the implications of
public choice are for the legal system.
The first wave took as its starting point the social choice and
interest group insights that the legislative process cannot guaranty
outcomes that are both fair and rational, and that concentrated inter-
est groups will exert disproportionate influence over the process. The
obvious issue raised by the prospect of legislative dysfunction was the
proper role for judges to play. How should public choice affect our
view of the nature of statutory interpretation and, more generally, of
judicial review?
Three commentators prompted a vigorous debate on this ques-
tion by offering distinct visions of statutory interpretation in a post-
public choice world. The starkest proposal was that of Judge Frank
Easterbrook. Judge Easterbrook suggested that courts not only
should recognize the role of interest groups in the political process,
but that they also should enforce any interest group bargains
reflected in the legislative product. 39 Rather than trying to "correct"
the process in some way, judges should interpret statutes in
accordance with the realities of how they were enacted. Judge
Richard Posner initially staked out a position similar to Judge
Easterbrook's,40 though he subsequently shifted his focus to a
perspective less obviously tied to the insights of public choice.41
39. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14-18 (1984). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 552 (1983) (arguing that courts should refuse to apply statutes
to issues not addressed by the terms of the statute).
40. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 284-85 (1982) (arguing that courts should defer to interest
group influence rather than find a constitutional right where constitutionality is unclear). See
also Rubin, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 52, 62 n.218 (cited in note 33) (contrasting Posner's current,
"imaginative reconstruction" approach with his earlier public-choice-influenced work).
41. Judge Posner's later view suggests that judges should view their role as extrapolating
from legislators' incomplete communications. Posner's current position is thus a variation of
traditional theories of statutory interpretation that call for judges to fill in statutory gaps.
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Professor Jonathan Macey responded to Judge Easterbrook
and to Judge Posner's initial position by proposing a more
independent, and more aggressive, role for courts. While agreeing
that courts should enforce clear interest group bargains, Professor
Macey contended that courts should refuse to enforce "implicit"
bargains-that is, interest group deals that legislators disguise by
defending the provision in question in public-regarding terms.
Professor Macey contended that by refusing to enforce implicit bar-
gains, courts could raise the costs to interest groups of obtaining
private interest legislation, and in doing so moderate the influence of
interest groups. 42
In addition to their political conservatism, each of the
commentators shared a view that the pessimistic insights of public
choice do, in fact, accurately describe the legislative process. Not
surprisingly, this perspective prompted a backlash of sorts. Most
prominently, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey acknowledged that the
public choice account of legislation is accurate in important respects,
but contended that many of the dire conclusions of public choice are
overstated. 43 In their view, judges should simply police the political
process for obvious defects, and should otherwise let the political
process run its course.
Although generally sympathetic to public choice, William
Eskridge shared some of Professors Farber and Frickey's concerns as
to its limitations. Professor Eskridge's model of statutory
interpretation called for judges to show solicitude for
underrepresented minorities when they exercise judicial review."
Cass Sunstein has used public choice insights in somewhat similar
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts 286-93 (Harvard U., 1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817 (1983)
(arguing that imaginative reconstruction based on incomplete legislative intent is the proper
judicial methodology rather than application of traditional canons); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986-87) (arguing that proper judicial interpretation involves judicial
action rather than inaction when judges are faced with an incomplete or ambiguous statute).
As noted in the text, Judge Posner's current view is only loosely tied to public choice. I
include it both because Judge Posner describes it as a continuation of his interest group
analysis, see Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 800 (cited in this note), and because Posner has
played a prominent role throughout the debate.
42. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 250-56 (1986).
43. Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 61-62, 153 (cited in note 10).
44. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 294 (cited in note 11).
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fashion, and has argued that courts should interpret statutes and the
Constitution so as to curb interest group excesses. 45
Despite the sophistication of the debate, nearly all of the pro-
posals suffered from a single, obvious weakness: in striking contrast
to their sober portrayal of legislators, the proposals tended to assume
that judges are somehow above the fray and can be wholly objective in
interpreting the statutes that come before them. Yet there is no rea-
son to believe that the judicial process is immune from interest group
activity and the other kinds of distortions that characterize legisla-
tion. Once we subject judges to the same public choice scrutiny previ-
ously reserved for legislators, it becomes much more difficult to
blithely assume that statutory interpretation can counteract the prob-
lems of legislative decisionmaking.4
Interestingly, the literature on the evolution of the common
law has proceeded on a somewhat analogous track, with overly opti-
mistic early accounts giving way to more realistic assessments of the
judicial process. Starting in the early 1970s, Judge Posner contended
that common law rules tend to become efficient over time, due in large
part to judges' unarticulated preference for efficient, rather than
inefficient, rules.4 Other commentators argued for the efficiency of
the common law on other grounds.48 Yet the differential interests of
45. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 405, 478-79 (1989) (suggesting courts should and sometimes do aggressively
construe statutes where concentrated interest grOups might otherwise undermine their
implementation); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1689, 1689-93 (1984).
For other prominent articles critical of the assumptions and use of public choice, see Richard
H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121 (1990) (criticizing the use of
social choice); Rubin, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 33) (criticizing public choice's
rationality assumption as too narrow an account of legislators' behavior and arguing for a
"comprehensive rationality" approach).
46. For one of the best, and most sustained, arguments along these lines, see generally,
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale
L. J. 31 (1991).
47. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 320-28 (Little, Brown, 1973). Posner
has restated this claim in subsequent editions of his treatise. See, for example, Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 520-21 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992) (stating that judges'
"aloof disinterese' in the outcome of cases replicates the invisible hand of the market). See also
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard U.,
1987) (attempting to show efficiency of tort law empirically).
48. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51, 53-57
(1977) (arguing that litigation by groups with a long-term interest in precedent can lead to
efficiency); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
Legal Stud. 65, 66-75 (1977) (arguing that more frequent litigation of inefficient rules prods
common law toward efficiency). For an excellent review of the literature, see Robert D. Cooter
and Daniel L. Rubinfield, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ.
Lit. 1067, 1091-97 (1989). In contrast to Posner's view, which focuses on judges, much of the
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different kinds of litigants, and other biases in the cases that go to
trial, suggest that any tendency toward common law efficiency is
likely to be, at most, a weak one.49
The first wave of public choice scholarship has thus compli-
cated, rather than simply clarified, our understanding of the roles of
legislators and judges. The extent to which interest group influence
and the distortions identified by social choice undermine the legisla-
tive process remains unclear. In addition, the ability of the judiciary
to counteract these influences on legislative decisions is open to ques-
tion. The obvious next step is to engage in a more nuanced compari-
son of decisionmaking institutions. As we shall see, this raises in-
triguing questions as to the future of public-choice-influenced legal
scholarship.
B. Catching the Next Wave
It seems safe to say, as I have just noted, that the next wave of
public choice scholarship will reflect an increasing interest in com-
parative institutional analysis. Rather than simply identifying the
flaws of a particular institution, public-choice-influenced legal
scholars will consider the comparative attributes of each of the
relevant institutions.50
Evidence of just such a trend already exists. A recent book by
Neil Komesar contends that there is an urgent need for comparative
other literature, including Rubin and Priest, has argued that the litigation process tends toward
efficiency even if judges are not themselves efficiency minded. For a critique, see Gillian K
Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 Geo. L. J. 583, 584-85, 594-98 (1992)
(distinguishing between "invisible hand" approaches and those based on judges' motivations,
and attempting to refute the latter).
49. See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1693-94
(1996) (arguing that litigants typically have little regard for the social costs imposed by
inefficient rules).
This is not to say that public choice influences affect courts to precisely the same extent as
they do legislatures. Federal judges do not face the same reelection pressures as legislators, for
instance, and thus may be somewhat less susceptible to interest group pressure. But they are
not immune. See, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative
Lawmaking System, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1147-53 (1991) (stating that specialized courts are
more susceptible to capture than generalized courts).
50. For an interesting article detecting an increasing interest in institutional analysis in
areas ranging from critical theory to law and economics, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1393, 1403-11 (1996). Although I share Rubin's view as to the importance of nuanced
institutional analysis, I am less optimistic that this trend will unify legal discourse to any
meaningful extent.
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institutional analysis in order to counteract the distortions of single
institution analysis in law-and-economics scholarship.5' Professor
Komesar's transaction costs model emphasizes the interests that
affected individuals or groups have, their costs of participation, and
how these factors change as we shift our focus among markets, the
legislative process, and the judicial system.52
With the enhanced sensitivity to comparative institutional
analysis, we can expect to see increasingly sophisticated applications
of public choice insights in the legal literature. Ironically, however,
existing comparative analysis has tended to fall into precisely the
same trap that its advocates criticize: the assumption that there
exists an objective, unbiased context where institutional distortions
can be corrected. Thus, comparative analysis often begins with a
nuanced assessment of the respective institutions, then shifts to a
prescriptive mode whose proposals depend on implementation by an
unbiased decisionmaker. Most frequently, the analysis awards this
status to courts, whose limitations are ignored when it comes time to
act on the insights of the comparative analysis. 53
It is easy enough to see the reason for this oversight. Because
legal scholarship is at its heart prescriptive, comparative analysts feel
a natural urge to progress from descriptive analysis to proposals for
change. 54 In doing so, however, they face a strong temptation to forget
the real world limitations of the institutions with which they are
concerned.
The obvious antidote to this problem is to pursue the analysis
all the way down-that is, to resist the temptation to address correc-
tives to a hypothetically unbiased decisionmaker. Yet this poses an
intriguing dilemma for future public choice scholarship. Given the
51. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives (cited in note 12).
52. One of Komesar's principal illustrations is tort reform. Whereas corporate tortfeasors
are well represented both in the judicial and legislative contexts, tort victims have effective
representation only in the courts. This is because the possible returns to potential tort victims
are too low, and their costs too high, to justify organizing to lobby legislatures. Id. at 171-77.
Only after a tort victim is injured, and considers filing suit, are her stakes high enough to justify
action. Id. In view of these facts, Komesar suggests (although only tentatively) that the
decision whether to limit tort damages may be more appropriately made by courts than
legislatures. Id. at 194-95.
53. Thomas Merrill has criticized Komesar's analysis in these terms. Thomas W. Merrill,
Institutional Choice and Political Faith, J. L. & Soc. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 61-65, on
file with the Author) (reviewing Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives (cited in note 12)).
Although courts, like legislatures, are imperfect, they face different pressures and may have
a comparative advantage in some respects. Merrill suggests that there are limits to how much
advantage an interest group may obtain by outspending its opponent in litigation. Id. at 29-30.
54. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. 1835, 1847-53 (1988).
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typically prescriptive nature of legal scholarship, what role can the
next wave of public choice literature, with its enhanced sensitivity to
institutional limitations, play? What can so relentlessly descriptive
an analysis aspire to?
In the following sections, I will suggest two ways in which the
next wave of public choice scholarship can perform an important
prescriptive function.
1. The Institution-Reinforcing Role of Public Choice
The first role that institutionally nuanced public choice schol-
arship can play might be described as "institution reinforcing." What
I mean by this is that descriptive public choice analysis may offer a
novel explanation of an existing institution, an explanation that rein-
forces rather than undermines the normative validity of the institu-
tion.55
One of the best recent examples comes from Professor Maxwell
Stearns's own work on standing doctrine. Constitutional law scholars
have for years criticized standing doctrine as, among other things, a
mechanism the Supreme Court uses to avoid deciding difficult issues
on the merits. As the Court's invocation of standing has increased, so
have the complaints that its use disguises the real reasons for the
Court's decisions. 56
Drawing on the insights of the social choice branch of public
choice, Professor Stearns has suggested a different explanation of
standing. Professor Stearns's account begins with the observation
that the Court faces the same problems, such as the risk of cycling or
of path dependence, as other collegial decisionmaking bodies.15
Moreover, because the Court must resolve the cases it hears, it does
55. Notice that successful institution-reinforcing scholarship may therefore succeed in
generating novel, non-intuitive insights about the effects of a given regime. For a discussion of
this in other law-and-economics contexts, see Jason Scott Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-
realist Explanation, 24 L. & Soc. Rev. 1217, 1227 (1990) (reviewing book by Steven Shavell and
noting this quality in the book).
56. See, for example, Louise Harmon, Fragments on the Deathwatch, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
61 n.120 (1992) (discussing the Coures avoidance of constitutional questions).
57. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest. Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309, 1335-50 (1995). See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social
Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1995) (providing empirical support for
Stearns's social choice theory applied to Supreme Court decisions). Judge Easterbrook was the
first legal commentator to view the decisionmaking of collegial courts through the lens of social
choice. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 813-32
(1982).
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not have the option of evading these perversities by simply doing
nothing, as legislators can in the event their preferences cycle.
Professor Stearns argues that for much of the Court's history, this has
not been a problem, since the justices have tended to hold single-
peaked preferences-usually, preferences arrayed along a single
spectrum from left to right. But the Court's membership and the
issues coming before it have increased in heterogeneity, which has
magnified the likelihood that they will have multipeaked
preferences.-5
The emergence of multipeaked preferences dramatically
increases the risk of path manipulation by ideological litigants. To
the extent judges (or circuits) are more likely than in the past to have
irreconcilable views on a given issue, strategic factors such as choice
of forum play an unusually, and inappropriately, important role both
in initial outcomes and in the development of precedent. 59 In
Professor Stearns's view, the Supreme Court's increasing use of
standing to dismiss cases is best seen not as an unprincipled refusal
to grapple with the merits, but as a means of counteracting this sort
of path manipulation.60  By limiting standing to litigants who are
most directly affected by the harm in question, the Court reduces the
likelihood that cases will be brought solely to influence the decision
path.61 Social choice thus may provide an important justification of an
otherwise puzzling trend in Supreme Court decisionmaking.
In illustrating how public choice can be used to explain an
existing institution, I have not yet suggested the prescriptive role that
such a project can serve. Yet it is easy to see how the act of descrip-
tion is itself prescriptive. By proposing a new way of conceptualizing
an existing institution, public choice scholars are attempting both to
58. See Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 349-85 (cited in note 57) (finding the Warren court
to have singlepeaked preferences, even on divisive issues such as whether to incorporate the Bill
of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
multipeaked preferences). The persuasiveness of Professor Stearns's analysis obviously
depends in important part on his contention that the Justices' preferences increasingly have
become multipeaked.
59. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing cycling, path dependence, and path
manipulation)
60. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1318 (cited in note 57); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 347-
48 (cited in note 57).
61. This is not to suggest that standing can eliminate path dependence in judicial
decisionmaking. The argument, instead, is that it reduces litigants' ability to manipulate the
path, thus enhancing the perceived fairness of the litigation process.
Notice, too, that the analysis requires that the Supreme Court justices hold similar views
about the role of standing--or at least act as if they did. If the justices' views on standing were
as divergent as their views on an underlying issue, standing would prove less effective in
counteracting path manipulation.
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describe, and, in some respects, to transform the institution in ques-
tion. Thus, if one or more justices agreed with Professor Stearns's
suggestion that standing is crucially concerned with minimizing path
manipulation, they might begin to speak explicitly in these terms in
their standing cases. To the extent this occurred, the social choice
explanation would both reinforce and alter existing standing doctrine.
There is, of course, a long tradition of law-and-economics schol-
arship that aspires to just this role.62 Because institution-reinforcing
scholarship seeks to explain what already is, it often does not produce
readily testable hypotheses. Yet the approach need not preclude
empirical examination, as some of the best law-and-economics efforts
to date have shown.63 One suspects that important work in public
choice scholarship will continue in this tradition.
2. Using Public Choice to Frame Reform
The illustration we have just considered suggests that public
choice can be used to explain, and thus to reinforce, an existing insti-
tution. Public choice analysis also could play an important role in
overtly seeking change. In particular, the analysis gives scholars a
tool not simply for describing an institution, but also for more effec-
tively framing a proposal for reform.64
As with the previous illustration, recent scholarship demon-
strates how public choice insights can be used to frame reform. In
their article on double taxation of corporate income, Jennifer Arlen
and Deborah Weiss offer an interest group explanation for the persis-
62. See Johnston, 24 L. & Soc. Rev. at 1224-27 (cited in note 55) (characterizing Landes
and Posner's arguments as to the efficiency of tort law as transformative in intent). My own
view is that most law-and-economics scholars divide into two categories: those who tend to
assume the existing regime is roughly appropriate, and who are thus are likely to engage in
institution-reinforcing scholarship; and those who are suspicious of existing law and are inclined
to call for sweeping change.
63. Landes and Posner's work is seen by some as an example, but it has been sharply
criticized by others. For another example, see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured
Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986) (developing relational theory to explain existing
secured transactions rules, and comparing it to existing evidence on lending patterns).
64. Existing work is much more likely to take the opposite approach, and to employ public
choice (usually interest group theory) analysis to explain why a proposal the author views as
optimal has not be adopted. Although this approach can yield valuable insights, it often has a
post hoc quality that suggests the work was primarily intended to preempt criticism that the
proposal in question is implausible or ill-founded.
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tence of a double tax despite a near consensus in favor of reform.65
Professors Arlen and Weiss contend that, although corporate manag-
ers would seem to be natural allies of tax reform, two factors suggest
that managers actually are the most obvious obstacles. First, manag-
ers may be lukewarm about reform because they would rather lobby
for tax benefits, such as investment tax credits, that benefit them
more directly. 66 Second, some managers may actively oppose reform,
since the "earnings trap" created by double taxation gives them
greater discretion to invest a firm's earnings than they would
otherwise have.67
Even more than their explanation of double taxation, what is
noteworthy about the analysis of Professors Arlen and Weiss for our
purposes is that they conclude by using their interest group insights
to suggest directions for effective reform. Given the implausibility of
reforming double taxation in the face of resistance by corporate man-
agers, Professors Arlen and Weiss argue that proponents should
propose a phased-in plan, rather than one-shot reform, in order to
maximize the benefit to the kinds of new investment that managers
tend to prefer.68 In addition, proponents should consider neutralizing
managers' resistance by focusing on proposals that preserve at least
some of the retained earnings trap-thus, adopting a second best
approach that could succeed rather than a purer reform that would
almost certainly fail. 69
This use of public choice as a means of framing a reform pro-
posal addresses an important criticism of the use of public choice
insights in the legal literature. In response to the first wave of public
choice scholarship, one prominent commentator argued that scholars'
descriptive analyses of existing institutions invariably are colored by
their own normative perspective on the issue and institution in ques-
65. See Jennifer Arlen and Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,
105 Yale L. J. 325, 363-65 (1995) (concluding that double taxation results from the resistance to
change by a small group of managers).
66. Id. at 340-42. The difference is that elimination of the double tax would principally
benefit existing capital rather than the kinds of future investment with which management is
most concerned.
67. Id. at 348-49 (noting also that some managers prefer the earnings trap, though the
number is likely to be small).
68. Professors Arlen and Weiss also note that proposals enhancing shareholder voice could
further reform efforts. Id. at 363-65.
69. Id. at 365-66. As a final consideration, Arlen and Weiss warn against proposals that
would permit specified kinds of firms to avoid double taxation, since such proposals would
undermine the benefited firms' incentive to press for more widespread reform. Id. at 367. Thus,
the recent success in obtaining pass-through tax treatment for new entity forms such as limited
liability companies could undermine efforts to reform the double tax.
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tion.70 In view of this, he argued that scholars should drop the public
choice analysis and simply debate their normative position directly,
rather than doing so indirectly and covertly through an ostensibly
neutral application of public choice.71
A scholar who uses public choice for framing purposes can, if
she wishes, clearly distinguish her normative inclinations from her
descriptive institutional analysis. The scholar could begin by stating
and defending her normative view and then turn to the insights of
public choice in order to frame a proposal that seems most likely to
succeed, given the realities of the institution in question. Such a
strategy has the important virtue of making the commentator's nor-
mative commitment explicit, without requiring her to sacrifice the
insights offered by a nuanced public choice analysis.
The framing strategy has a second valuable attribute. Public
choice is often criticized as excessively malleable-that is, as lending
itself to any conclusion a commentator wishes to reach. An important
virtue of the framing strategy is that it can be used to develop
testable hypotheses about the nature of a decisionmaking
institution.72 To return to the corporate double taxation example73
the analysis of Professors Arlen and Weiss suggests that proposals
providing for phased-in implementation, and those that preserve some
of the retained earnings trap, will prove more successful than
proposals that do not do either of these things. Their prediction, like
the predictions of other scholars who propose a framing strategy, can
be tested by tracking the historical and/or the subsequent pattern of
actual legislative, judicial, or market activity.
3. Conclusion
In describing ways that scholars can make use of the increas-
ing sensitivity to comparative institutional analysis, I do not mean to
suggest that all public-choice-influenced legal scholarship will adopt
these kinds of approaches. Public choice will no doubt continue to be
70. Elhauge, 101 Yale L. J. at 49-59 (cited in note 46). See also David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Review of William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics, 88 Pub. Choice
433, 434-35 (1996) (suggesting similar reservations about Fischel's unstated assumptions in
Fischel's fascinating interest group assessment of takings law).
71. Elhauge, 101 Yale L. J. at 62-63 (cited in note 46).
72. For a similar observation about transaction cost economics, see Johnston, 24 L. & Soc.
Rev. at 1243 (cited in note 55) (stating that transaction cost economics has the virtue of generat-
ing testable mathematical hypotheses).
73. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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used as a source of occasional insights into analyses whose focus is
elsewhere, much as it is now.
Nevertheless, to the extent public choice scholarship does
progress in a discernable direction beyond the first wave, there almost
certainly will be an increasing recognition of the importance of com-
parative institutional analysis. Both institution-reinforcing analysis
and framing strategies are ways for scholars to employ a nuanced
institutional analysis while at the same time engaging in legal aca-
demics' traditional task of prescribing solutions to perceived problems
in the law.
IV. REVIEWING PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
Having discussed the terminology and the significance of public
choice for the legal literature, we now have a useful context for con-
sidering Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary more
explicitly.
Writing a reader is, in many respects, a low ceiling project. 4
In assembling and editing a group of law review articles and related
materials, the editor/author's principal contribution often is simply to
save other teachers and scholars the time and expense of performing
this function themselves. A reader that does this successfully may
prove financially rewarding to the editor/author, but it does not pro-
vide any particular contribution to the literature.
Even from the subtitle, it quickly becomes apparent that
Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary has
appreciably larger ambitions. As "Readings and Commentary"
suggests, the book consists of extended discussions of the articles
included and many of the issues the articles raise. This ongoing
commentary is as central to the book as the articles themselves, and
gives Public Choice and Public Law a distinctive, "through-written"
feel that is quite remarkable for a book of this kind. To show this, let
me begin by briefly describing the book itself, and by focusing on
several choices Professor Stearns has made in deciding which articles
to include. I will then conclude by discussing how the commentary
ties the articles together in such a way as to make Public Choice and
74. Fortunately for those who prepare them, they also can be a low cost project. At its
simplest, a reader may be little more than a by-product of a scholar's own class preparation.
Once the scholar has selected and edited the materials, preparing the reader for publication
may entail little extra effort.
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Public Law an important new contribution to the public choice
literature in its own right.
The book is divided into three long chapters. The first chapter
begins with a subchapter devoted to the debate about public choice's
assumptions that decisionmakers are rational and act in their own
self-interest. The chapter then concludes with a subchapter labelled
"Economic Reasoning: An Introduction to Modelling." Although
Professor Stearns's commentary does discuss modelling in some
detail, the more obvious theme of the articles is that each focuses on
or critiques the interest group branch of public choice theory. Thus,
the subchapter includes articles taking differing views of the
implications of interest group theory for the line item veto75 and
legislative delegation,'7 together with Professor Elhauge's critique of
the literature using interest group theory to justify particular
perspectives on judicial review.77
Professor Stearns devotes the second chapter to the social
choice branch of public choice. The chapter uses articles by Professors
Stearns and Saul Levmore to introduce central social choice concerns,
such as cycling.78 The remaining articles in the chapter consider
bicameralism, legislative intent, and judicial decisionmaking from a
social choice perspective. The first two chapters thus give a complete
introduction to public-choice-influenced legal literature, including
public choice's rationality assumptions and its two major branches.
Together, these chapters cover roughly one-half of the book.
The remainder of the book consists of a single chapter labelled
"Applications of Covered Concepts." In this final chapter, Professor
Stearns shifts from a focus on the basic contours of public choice
theory, to articles that have used some aspect of public choice analysis
to shed light on a particular issue. In brief, the chapter includes
articles using interest group theory, social choice theory, or both, to
75. Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 385 (1992), in Stearns, PCPL at 77 (cited in note 2); Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice
Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1988), in Stearns, PCPL at 101 (cited in note
2).
76. Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982), in Stearns, PCPL at 134 (cited in note 2); Jerry Mashaw,
Prodelegation" Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 81
(1985), in Stearns, PCPL at 180 (cited in note 2).
77. Elhauge, 101 Yale L. J. at 31 (cited in note 46), in Stearns, PCPL at 204 (cited in note
2).
78. Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox,
75 Va. L. Rev. 971 (1989), in Stearns, PCPL at 258 (cited in note 2); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at
1219 (cited in note 21), in Stearns, PCPL at 295 (cited in note 2).
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explore stare decisis, statutory interpretation, the efficiency of the
common law, and standing. The chapter then concludes with
summaries of articles on discrimination 9
It quickly becomes apparent that Professor Stearns has made
two very important choices in selecting the materials he includes,
both of which affect the tone of the book and the kinds of courses for
which it is most useful. First, Professor Stearns has limited his focus
to the legal literature that employs public choice analysis, omitting
almost entirely the contributions to public choice of economists and
political scientists. 0 The problem posed by this choice is that, because
all of public choice's foundational works were nonlegal, Professor
Stearns must acquaint his readers with this work indirectly, by
including law review articles that themselves discuss the seminal
nonlegal contributions. Fortunately, the omission of nonlegal works
proves to be a strength rather than a weakness of the book. Not only
are law review articles likely to be much more effective pedagogically
in law school classes, but Professor Stearns also has edited the
articles in such a way as to include rich discussions of the important
nonlegal public choice literature.81
In addition to focusing on the legal literature, Professor
Stearns also has selected only public law analysess2 Consequently,
Public Choice and Public Law omits entirely the burgeoning public
choice literature on private law concerns such as tax policy and corpo-
rate takeover doctrine.83 This is not to say that the book is of interest
79. Lynn Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice An Economic Inquiry into
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 Geo. L. J. 1787 (1989), in Stearns, PCPL at
901 (cited in note 2); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003 (1995), in Stearns, PCPL at
909 (cited in note 2).
80. The articles that come closest to being exceptions appeared in economics-oriented legal
journals. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It" Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1992), in Stearns, PCPL at 393 (cited in note 2) (written
by a political scientist); Rubin, 6 J. Legal Stud. at 51 (cited in note 48), in Stearns, PCPL at 727
(cited in note 2) (economist).
81. This is particularly apparent in Professor Stearns's decisions as to which footnotes to
include and which to omit. Although many footnotes are omitted, Professor Stearns has tended
to retain those that reference pivotal non-legal contributions to, or describe, the development of
the public choice literature. In the first article, for instance, the footnotes he includes cite to
much of the important political science literature. See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey,
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987), in Stearns, PCPL at 11 n.56, 12
nn.59-62, 67, 13 nn.69-70, 73, 75 (cited in note 2). See also Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68
Cornell L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 76), in Stearns, PCPL at 144 n.76, 153 n.134, 154 nn.136-39,
141 (cited in note 2) (providing references to foundational non-legal work in social choice).
82. The inclusion of"Public Law" in the title of the book makes this selection clear.
83. Saul Levmore alludes to this approach in his characteristically insightful foreward to
the book. Saul Levmore, Foreward to Maxwell L. Stearns, Public Choice and Public Law:
Readings and Commentary xv (Anderson, 1997). As a result, Public Choice and Public Law is in
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only to public law scholars, however. The entire structure of public
choice analysis can be seen as "public" in nature, since much of the
literature focuses on the general dynamics of the legislative and judi-
cial processes. It is only at the application stage that the focus of
private law scholars diverges from that of their public law colleagues.
A private law scholar who wished to teach from Public Choice and
Public Law might therefore assign all of the first two chapters, while
substituting private law applications in the final chapter.
84
Anyone who is familiar with Professor Stearns's own path-
breaking work on social choice and constitutional process will have no
difficulty understanding his reasons for structuring the book as he
has. In addition to providing a representative selection of articles, the
book also can be seen as reflecting the intellectual concerns of its
author. Most obviously, we see this in Professor Stearns's inclusion of
three of his own articles.85
some respects a natural substitute for a legislation course, as Levmore also points out. Id. But
it can easily be adapted to other courses, as I describe in the text below.
84. Some of my own picks might include, in the tax area, Arlen and Weiss, 105 Yale L. J.
325 (cited in note 65) (discussing interest group theory of double taxation); Richard L.
Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax
Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987) (interest group theory of tax legislation); Daniel Shaviro,
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest. A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by
Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (considering interest group, populist,
and psychological factors in tax legislation). In corporate law, I would include, among others,
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111 (1987)
(antitakeover statutes); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI Press,
1993) (charter competition in corporate law, antitakeover statutes); Roe, Strong Managers,
Weak Owners (cited in note 9) (political explanation of separation of ownership and control);
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987) (charter competition). For bankruptcy, Eric A.
Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Author). See also Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995) (interest group theory of uniform
laws process in commercial law). I am, of course, also partial to my own work in bankruptcy,
David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis.
L. Rev. 465, 495-595 (1993) (applying interest group theory to bankruptcy legislation), and
corporate law, Skeel, 83 Va. L. Rev. (cited in note 21) (forthcoming February 1997) (considering
the effect of the Delaware Supreme Court's norm of unanimous decision making in social choice
and interest group terms). See also David A. Skeel Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 512-45 (1994) (discussing charter
competition in corporate law and arguing that a similar process would lead to superior
bankruptcy laws if states regulated corporate bankruptcy).
85. Stearns, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 385 (cited in note 75), in Stearns, PCPL at 77
(cited in note 2); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1219 (cited in note 21), in Stearns, PCPL at 295 (cited
in note 2); Stearns, 83 Calif. L. Rev. at 1309 (cited in note 57), in Stearns, PCPL at 787 (cited in
note 2). One suspects that subsequent editions also will include his recent contribution to a
colloquium debating the merits of issue-by-issue and outcome voting by courts. Maxwell L.
Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor
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More importantly, and more interestingly, the connections
between the book and Professor Stearns's own ongoing project are
evident throughout the commentary interspersed among the readings.
As I have noted, Professor Stearns's commentary is extensive, and
often includes lengthy discussions that are as substantive and nu-
anced as the readings that precede them. Professor Stearns gives a
lengthy analysis of voting and the benefits of the simplified models
used by economists after the first set of readings,86 for instance, and
offers an alternative economic explanation of judicial holdings in
response to a pair of articles on stare decisis.87
Given that Public Choice and Public Law chronicles the
emergence and flowering of public choice in the legal literature, many
of the articles come from what I have described as the first wave of
public-choice-influenced legal scholarship. But, Professor Stearns's
commentary places the book firmly into the second wave. He is
keenly aware of the need to perform a comparative institutional
analysis, and this recurs throughout the commentary.8 8 The nature of
his analysis is almost always institution-reinforcing. One after
another, the commentaries suggest public choice explanations as to
why our public institutions have developed as they have, and why
that development makes sense. The economic explanation of judicial
holdings that I just noted has this character, as does his account of
the Supreme Court's Marks doctrine which I discuss below. One
might even say that what Public Choice and Public Law is "about" is
the versatility of the institution-reinforcing approach to public choice.
The sense one gets in reading the commentaries together with
the articles that prompt them, is that one is participating in Professor
Stearns's own thinking process. The analogy that comes most
immediately to mind is jazz. Traditional readers often either omit
commentary entirely, or conclude each section with a series of brief,
targeted questions based on the readings in the section. Much like a
jazz performance, and in striking contrast, Professor Stearns's
commentary picks up on particular themes and explores them at
length, taking them in intriguing, and sometimes unexpected,
directions. At times these flights seem unnecessarily digressive or
fall flat. Professor Stearns's relatively lengthy discussion of the
economic concept of an Edgeworth Box may well have been important
John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045 (1996) (defending outcome voting on social
choice grounds).
86. Stearns, PCPL at 64-72 (cited in note 2).
87. Id. at 546.
88. See, for example, id. at 366-68 (comparing legislatures and courts).
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to his own early thinking on these issues, for instance, but it seems
unnecessary to a full understanding of the public choice literature.89
More often, however, the commentary provides surprising, and
genuinely new, insights. To give just one example, in his commentary
on a pair of articles on legislative delegation, Professor Stearns moves
from logrolling to a discussion of the Supreme Court's Marks" doc-
trine. This doctrine holds that plurality decisions should be construed
in accordance with the narrowest of the opinions that voted for the
controlling outcome. Although the doctrine is surprising in some
respects,91 Professor Stearns speculates that it may accord with the
Median Voter Theorem insight that majority voting pulls both
extreme positions toward the middle.92 He reasons that the Median
Voter Theorem suggests that it is much more likely that all of the
Justices in a fragmented majority would prefer the narrow opinion
over the dissenting view than it is that they all would prefer a more
sweeping holding.9 3 Both the initial question-whether the Marks
doctrine is the best approach to fractured decisions-and Stearns's
use of social choice in an institution-reinforcing fashion to suggest a
tentative answer are fascinating contributions.
It is in these thoughtful, occasionally idiosyncratic explorations
that Public Choice and Public Law makes a genuine contribution to
the public choice literature. Professor Stearns suggests new perspec-
tives, and new questions, that will no doubt figure both in his own
future work, and in the thinking of other scholars. At the same time,
Professor Stearns does not neglect the traditional function of a reader.
The articles are intelligently edited, and the selections are admirably
representative of the public choice legal literature. On one or two
occasions, I might have chosen different examples of an author's
89. Id. at 362-66. The Edgeworth Box is a graph that depicts the points which maximize
the utilities of two individuals with respect to fixed quantities of two different items. Although
it seems unnecessary to Professor Stearns's discussion, which explores Pareto optimality and
comparative institutional advantage, the discussion subsequently offers several intriguing
speculations about the point of the Pareto criterion.
90. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
91. To give the most obvious example, an opinion that received only one vote may control
if it is the narrowest of the opinions that voted for the majority outcome.
92. For a description of the Median Voter Theorem, see note 24.
93. Stated differently, the Marks doctrine can be seen as assuming that there will be a
consensus among the majority justices supporting the narrow view over the dissent. Stearns,
PCPL at 126-29 (cited in note 2). Notice that this may not be the case if the justices' preferences
prove to be multipeaked, since part of the majority in such a case might prefer the dissent over
the narrow opinion.
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work.94 But I was hard-pressed to think of any crucial articles that
Professor Stearns omitted. In addition to including the most
important work thus far, the book also provides a bibliography at the
end of each subchapter, as well as extended appendices. Public
Choice and Public Law is thus an extremely valuable reference for the
first wave of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship, and a
powerful demonstration of what may well be the next wave.
94. Two examples come from a subchapter on legislative intent. First, I might have
included Judge Frank Easterbrook's article, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreward The
Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1984), rather than his article Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983), in Stearns, PCPL at 557 (cited in note 2), as it is
arguably more important and more directly concerned with the implications of public choice for
statutory interpretation. Second, I might have omitted Richard Posner's article, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 179 (1986-87), in Stearns, PCPL at 572 (cited in note 2), altogether, as it arguably
does not make use of public choice insights at all. Yet in each case, Professor Stearns's choices
are defensible. Judge Easterbrook's article contains extensive discussions of cases selected
solely because they were decided in the 1983 term, for instance, and Judge Posner's article
illustrates, as I discussed earlier, how dramatically his current view of statutory interpretation
has changed from his earlier views. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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